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Abstract
Numerous studies have investigated the link between trade policy and ﬁrm productivity. De-
spite justifying ﬁrm level analysis on the basis of considerable heterogeneity between ﬁrms within
narrowly deﬁned industries, these studies typically constrain all ﬁrms to have the same expected
response to changes in trade policy. In this paper we develop a theoretical model that accounts
for the existence of ﬁrm level heterogeneity within industries and predicts that the equilibrium
response to changes in trade policy will also be heterogeneous in terms of both sign and size. The
variation in ﬁrm level reaction is shown to be determined by both ﬁrm and industry characteris-
tics and therefore the equilibrium response to trade policy is predicted to vary not only within
industries but also across industries. These results allow us to use both sources of variation in
the data. We examine these predictions on a ﬁrm level data set for the Colombian manufacturing
sector in the 1980’s and ﬁnd strong support for them.
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11 Introduction
A common question in discussions of trade reform is what impact, if any, trade policy has on ﬁrm and
industry productivity. Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, many developing countries erected trade
barriers in the hope of expanding the industrial sectors of their economy. The standard rationale
behind such policy was that ﬁrms would feel better able to invest in new infrastructure and advanced
production techniques if guaranteed protection from foreign competition. Thus, trade barriers were
seen as a necessary component in developing infant industries. This policy of economic development
through protectionism has largely been supplanted by an emerging conventional wisdom that greater
openness to foreign competition induces productivity gains. The idea behind the new strategy is that
domestic ﬁrms will be forced to adopt new technologies and cut costs in order to compete with foreign
ﬁrms. Thus, the reduction of domestic trade barriers is now seen as necessary in providing impetus
for domestic ﬁrms to modernize. In this paper, we analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the
link between trade policy and ﬁrm productivity.
Not surprisingly, there is a voluminous empirical literature on the question of whether the liberal-
ization of domestic trade barriers improves ﬁrm productivity performance.1 However, this empirical
evidence is relatively mixed. Some studies suggest that the typical ﬁrm improves its productivity
performance in response to lower tariﬀs (see for example Krishna and Mitra (1998), Pavcnik (2002),
Muendler (2004), Amiti and Konings (2005) and Fernandes (2006)). Other studies ﬁnd the opposite,
that a ﬁrms productivity performance is improved by tariﬀ protection (Konings and Vandenbussche
(2004)). Finally, some studies ﬁnd that a reduction in domestic tariﬀs has no signiﬁcant impact on
ﬁrm level productivity (Treﬂer (2004)).2 In a sense, the contradictory results of previous empirical
literature are not that surprising as the mechanism through which trade actually impacts ﬁrm pro-
ductivity is not formalized, and thus, there is no a priori reason to expect any particular relation.3
One obvious means by which trade impacts ﬁrm productivity is by aﬀecting the decisions of ﬁrms to
invest in new production techniques and adopt new technologies. However, even in the theoretical
technology adoption literature, the impact of trade on ﬁrm productivity is ambiguous. This is nicely
demonstrated in Rodrik (1992) which shows that standard arguments for how trade barriers might
impact ﬁrm productivity are misleading or incomplete.4
In this paper we develop a model of endogenous technology adoption by proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
1Imports are not the only mechanism through which global competition impacts productivity. See Javorcik (2004)
for an analysis of FDI and productivity.
2Also see Baggs, Head, and Ries (2002), Bustos (2006) and Conway (2006) for other studies of plant-level data
and the impact of trade liberalization. Syverson (2004) also ﬁnds results that are contrary to the existing theoretical
models.
3Indeed the relatively atheoretic approach in the empirical literature stems from the lack of any clear predictions
from the theoretical literature. Tybout (2002) provides a succinct summary of the empirical view of the theoretical
literature. As we note below the previous theoretical literature has concentrated almost exclusively on representative
ﬁrm models, leaving no scope for any within industry heterogeneity in response to trade barriers.
4Also see Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) in which the impact of trade protection on technology adoption depends
crucially on the precise characteristics of the trade barriers.
2within a small, open economy. Our framework includes two key features missing from previous
models. First, our model allows for diﬀerences between ﬁrms within industries, and in contrast to
other models these diﬀerences are not imposed exogenously but derived endogenously. In particular,
diﬀerences between ex ante identical ﬁrms are derived as the equilibrium outcome of a technology
adoption process, where diﬀusion arises in equilibrium (i.e. ﬁrms adopt at diﬀerent dates).5 Sec-
ond, unlike previous models of technology adoption we allow the number of ﬁrms to be determined
endogenously.6 Together these elements generate a framework where ﬁrms make proﬁt maximizing
decisions regarding their technology, yet ex ante identical ﬁrms end up behaving diﬀerently in equi-
librium. In this framework we ask what are the implications of a change in trade policy. The main
conclusion is that the equilibrium response to a change in trade policy is heterogeneous: both across
ﬁrms and across industries.
However, the richness of the equilibrium response should not be interpreted to mean that almost
anything can happen. Instead the model provides insight into the conditions where trade barriers
are likely to raise productivity growth and when the opposite is likely to occur. More speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd that, holding the number of domestic ﬁrms constant, a tariﬀ has a positive impact on ﬁrm
productivity (this result is due primarily to the scale eﬀect where a tariﬀ results in larger sales
for domestic ﬁrms). However, the increased domestic proﬁts created by a tariﬀ induces entry by
domestic ﬁrms, which reduces the incentive for each individual ﬁrm to adopt the productivity-
improving innovation. Thus, the positive direct eﬀect of trade protection is countered by a negative
indirect eﬀect. The dynamic tension between the direct and indirect eﬀects has two important
implications.
First, we show that this indirect eﬀect is weaker at the beginning of the diﬀusion process and
stronger at the end of the diﬀusion process, resulting in trade barriers having a positive impact on
productivity for those ﬁrms who adopt new technologies most readily, and a negative impact on
productivity for the late-adopting ﬁrms. Moreover, the implication of this result is that the impact
of trade policy diﬀers across ﬁrms in the same industry. These diﬀerences are not just qualitative;
some ﬁrms grow faster while others grow slower (i.e. the derivatives have diﬀerent signs).
Second, given this heterogeneity in response to a tariﬀ, it is natural to ask what happens to
the majority of ﬁrms within an industry. We show that the indirect eﬀect is stronger in industries
with certain characteristics: low entry costs, high trade barriers, large domestic markets and a small
technology gap between ﬁrms. The implication of this result is that the impact of a given trade
policy on ﬁrm productivity is heterogeneous across industries, with the behavior of a typical ﬁrm
(say the median ﬁrm) within an industry conditional on the characteristics of that industry (i.e.
the impact of a change in tariﬀs interacts with industry characteristics). The consequences of this
ﬁnding for the previous literature are two fold. First, the model predicts that the impact on the
mean ﬁrm within an industry is ambiguous. Therefore it is not surprising that previous studies found
mixed results as they all focused on the average impact of reductions in trade barriers. Second, by
5See Yeaple (2005) for a static model of trade and technology choice.
6Both Rodrik (1992) and Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) are primarily concerned with a single import competing ﬁrm.
3not controlling for the interactions between industry characteristics and tariﬀ changes, the previous
studies have not allowed for the diversity of response that is possible across industries, generating a
potentially important source of bias.
To pursue these issues we look for evidence of such variation in productivity when trade barriers
change by investigating the experience of Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms in the 1980’s.7 This was
a period of widespread trade liberalization in Colombia, with the average tariﬀ falling from a peak
of 45 percent in 1984 to 21 percent in 1991. Moreover, the initial tariﬀ rates and the subsequent
changes in tariﬀs varied widely across industries, providing a rich setting for the investigation of
the impact of trade policy on ﬁrm level productivity. Using ﬁrm level productivity measures and
a number of industry level characteristics that the theory predicts should be important for how
trade policy impacts an industry, we look for ﬁrm/industry heterogeneity in the tariﬀ response, by
including interaction terms in standard productivity growth regressions.
We ﬁnd evidence of ﬁrm/industry heterogeneity that is consistent with our theoretical predic-
tions. In particular, comparing the behavior of the median ﬁrm across industries, it is found that
the direct eﬀect of higher tariﬀs is to increase productivity growth of the median ﬁrm. However, the
total eﬀect includes the indirect eﬀects of tariﬀ changes that interact with industry characteristics.
Consistent with the theoretical model, industries that have lower barriers to entry, a smaller tech-
nology gap, larger domestic markets and higher initial tariﬀs tend to experience lower productivity
growth when tariﬀs increase. Not only are these interaction terms statistically signiﬁcant, but they
also represent economically meaningful magnitudes. Furthermore, these ﬁndings are robust across
a number of speciﬁcations.
We also ﬁnd evidence that tariﬀ changes have a diﬀerential impact on productivity growth rates
of ﬁrms within industries. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms that would be predicted to have high productivity
growth over the period investigated (the early adopters), had this growth further enhanced by an
increase in tariﬀs. In contrast, ﬁrms that would be predicted to have low productivity growth
(the late adopters), tended to have their performance further undermined by a tariﬀ. It is worth
reiterating that these results relate to ﬁrms in the same narrowly deﬁned industry and are consistent
with the theoretical model that relates the diﬀusion of technology to changes in trade policy. These
results, together with the theoretical model, suggest that the mixed empirical ﬁndings of the previous
literature arise from misspeciﬁed models, and that the relationship between productivity and trade
policy is more nuanced than previously considered, both within and across industries.
Section 2 of the paper provides a model of ﬁrm decisions to adopt productivity-enhancing tech-
nologies under monopolistic competition. In Section 3 we use this model to generate predictions
on how tariﬀ changes impact ﬁrm technology decisions and hence productivity growth. Finally, in
Sections 4 and 5, we use the Colombian trade liberalization to investigate potential heterogeneity in
the marginal impact of tariﬀ changes on productivity growth.
7For studies on Colombia over a similar time period see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Brooks (2006) and Fernandes
(2006).
42 Model
To consider how trade barriers impact ﬁrm productivity, we must ﬁrst develop a model of what
determines a ﬁrms decision to invest in a productivity-enhancing technology. In this section we
present such a model of endogenous technology adoption. The adoption decision of ﬁrms follows
the standard setup as presented in Reinganum (1981), with the exception that this framework is
integrated into a model of monopolistic competition with endogenous entry. By considering adoption
in a setting of monopolistic competition we are following G¨ otz (1999) and Ederington and McCalman
(2006). However, both of these papers use CES preferences while we employ a quadratic utility
function since it features a demand system with variable elasticities of demand.8
2.1 Preferences and Consumption Decisions
We assume that the economy has two sectors: one sector consists of a numeraire good, x0, while the
other sector is characterized by diﬀerentiated products. The following utility function deﬁnes the
preferences of a representative consumer:
U = x0(t) + C(t) (1)
where x0(t) is consumption of the numeraire good in time t and C(t) represents an index of con-
sumption of the diﬀerentiated goods. We assume a quadratic speciﬁcation for this consumption
















where y(i,t) represents consumption of brand i at time t and n(t) represents the number of varieties
available at time t. Since the instantaneous utility is quasi-linear demand for good i at time t is:
y(i,t) = A(t) − p(i,t) (2)
where p(i,t) is the price of good i in time t and A(t) =
α+n(t)p(t)
(1+n(t)) is the choke price and p(t) is the
average price in the industry. If we treat these as individual demands, market demand follows from
multiplying individual demands by population. For simplicity we normalize population size to unity.
2.2 Technology
In order to facilitate the analysis the production side of the economy is kept as simple as possible.
We assume that all goods are produced using constant returns to scale technologies and a single
factor of production, labor. Thus, production of any good (or brand) requires a certain amount
of labor per unit of output. As is standard, we assume that production of the numeraire good is
deﬁned by l = x0 which ensures that the equilibrium wage is equal to unity.
8For models that emphasizes trade and technology in a strategic setting see Bagwell and Staiger (1992), Miyagiwa
and Ohno (1995) and Crowley (2006).
5In order to produce in the diﬀerentiated goods sector we assume that ﬁrms must pay a sunk entry
fee of F. Once this fee has been paid, a variety of the diﬀerentiated good can be produced using
either of two types of technology. A low-productivity technology is always available to any ﬁrm upon
entering the industry. The constant marginal cost of production for a low-tech ﬁrm is denoted by c.
A high-productivity technology is also available at time t = 0, but requires an additional fee of k(t)
where k(0) = ∞, k(∞) = k, k0 < 0 and k00 > 0.9 With this adoption cost function, earlier adoption
is more expensive; however, the decreasing cost of technology adoption implies that eventually all
ﬁrms that remain in the industry will adopt the high-tech process. The marginal cost of production
using the high-productivity technology is assumed to be zero. Therefore, c is an index of the size of
the technological innovation.
The general aim of the model is to analyze the impact of trade barriers on the industrial evolution
of an industry within a small, open country which faces a technology gap in competing with more
productive foreign ﬁrms. To further simplify the model, assume that the number of foreign ﬁrms
is ﬁxed and that they are all high-tech. In contrast, domestic ﬁrms are, initially, all low-tech (i.e.,
they face a technology gap relative to their foreign rivals that they can close by adopting the hi-tech
methods). For simplicity it is assumed that domestic ﬁrms don’t export. In this model, domestic
ﬁrms have four choices to make: when to enter, what price to charge, when to adopt the new
technology, and whether (and when) to exit. Since the pricing decision is central to all of the other
decisions through its impact on proﬁts, this is where we begin our characterization of ﬁrm behavior.
2.3 Prices and Proﬁts
The model admits heterogeneity in terms of the technology of domestic ﬁrms. The goal is to derive
these technological positions endogenously. However, to start with we assume that some fraction, q,
of the domestic ﬁrms are hi-tech. Given the linear demands and constant marginal cost, the optimal













where b represents the speciﬁc tariﬀ applied by the domestic government and (*) indicates the price
of a foreign variety. The average price is:










2α + cnh(1 − q) + bnf
2 + n
(3)
9These are standard assumptions in the technology diﬀusion literature, see for example Reinganum (1981) and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). The only diﬀerence is that we assume k(t) is bounded from below to rule out the
possibility of entry occurring after all the initial entrants have adopted. Note that in these papers the possibility of
entry is not considered.
6where θ represents the fraction of ﬁrms that are domestic and n = nh + nf; nh and nf are the
number of domestic and foreign ﬁrms, respectively.









Since cL = c and cH = 0, hi-tech ﬁrms make larger per-period proﬁts. Thus, the basic payoﬀ to
adopting a productivity-enhancing technology is that it results in lower marginal costs of production,
and thus higher per-period proﬁts in equilibrium. However, since A is declining in q, the pay-oﬀ to
adoption is also declining in q.
2.4 Technological Progress
The next decision we consider is that of technology adoption. For the moment we take the number
of ﬁrms as given (and constant), and we return to this issue below. The equilibrium distribution of
technology at any point in time, q(t), is determined by the ﬁrms’ selection of their optimal adoption
dates. Taking this distribution as given, a ﬁrm chooses the adoption date, T, to maximize the







e−rtπH(q(t))dt − K(T) − F
where K(T) = e−rTk(T). These proﬁts depend on both the ﬁrm’s own adoption date, T, and the
adoption decisions of rival ﬁrms (which is summarized by the distribution function q(t)). Diﬀeren-
tiating with respect to T yields the ﬁrst-order condition:
πH − πL = −K0erT (4)
The above ﬁrst-order condition demonstrates the trade-oﬀ faced by ﬁrms in the choice of when
to adopt. The left-hand side is the lost proﬁts from waiting one more period to adopt the high-
productivity technology while the right-hand side is the gain from the decrease in adoption costs from












Not surprisingly this tells us that the choke price is decreasing over time. This also tells us that
when the ﬁrst order conditions hold, proﬁts (either πL or πH) are independent of n, b and α.
Returning to the evaluation of the ﬁrst order condition, note in particular that it holds for all
ﬁrms that have yet to adopt. However, if all such ﬁrms adopted at once this ﬁrst order condition
10The program is for a ﬁrm that enters at t = 0 and never exits. Later we will show that this is optimal in equilibrium
under our assumptions.
7would not hold, with most ﬁrms instead preferring to adopt at other dates in the future (since
adoption en masse would drive the LHS below the RHS). This implies that the ﬁrst order condition
doesn’t just hold at one point in time but over an interval, with a ﬁrm indiﬀerent over which date
in this interval it adopts (i.e. an early adoption date confers a greater increase in proﬁts but is
associated with a higher opportunity cost, while a later date involves a lower proﬁt diﬀerential but
also a lower opportunity cost of waiting.) By combining (3) and (5), the distribution function that
describes the optimal adoption dates is derived as:
q∗(t) =

   
   








c2nh for t ∈ [TL,TH]
1 for t ∈ (TH,∞)
The above distribution function describes the process of technological progress for domestic ﬁrms.
Given initially high adoption costs, all domestic ﬁrms are low-tech until TL. At TL the ﬁrst domestic
ﬁrm adopts the high-productivity technology and, as adoption costs fall, more domestic ﬁrms adopt
the new technology, leading to a gradual diﬀusion of the new technology through the industry for
periods TL ≤ t ≤ TH (where the fraction of ﬁrms that have adopted at any point in time is given by
q∗(t)). Finally, all ﬁrms will have adopted the new technology by period TH.
To close the model we assume entry occurs until the present value of proﬁts are zero. These
proﬁts can be split into three periods, π0, when all local ﬁrms are low-tech, ΠA, proﬁts during the
adoption process and π1, proﬁts when everyone is hi-tech. We use δ0 and δ1 to denote the discount
factors associated with the initial and subsequent steady states. This zero proﬁt condition implicitly
deﬁnes the number of ﬁrms (varieties):11, 12
11The zero proﬁt condition is written for the last ﬁrm to adopt. To see that it is immaterial which adoption date










−rtdt + δ1π1 − K(TH) = F




−rtdt = K(TH) − K(TL)
which must hold in equilibrium due to (4).
12Note that this zero proﬁt condition also implies that there will be no exit. To see this note that the following
conditions hold in equilibrium:
δ0π0 + ΠA + δ1π1 − K(TH) = F





1 are the variable proﬁts from operating in an environment where all other ﬁrms are high-tech. If π
L
1 =0, then
ﬁrms potentially have an incentive to exit. However, if π
L
1 =0, then the above equilibrium conditions imply:
δ1π1 > K(TH)
8Π = δ0π0 +
Z TH
TL













− K(TH) − F = 0
where A0 =
2(α−c)+nf(b−c)
n+2 , A1 =
2α+nfb
n+2 and A(q(t)) is deﬁned by (5).
A straightforward application of the envelope theorem veriﬁes that equilibrium proﬁts are de-
clining in nh. This ensures a unique equilibrium. Given that entry occurs until the present value
of proﬁts is equal to zero, this zero-proﬁt condition along with q(t)∗ (deﬁned by 6) characterizes an
equilibrium in a small open economy.
3 Technology Gaps and Trade Policy
Having setup a benchmark model of productivity-enhancing technology adoption, we can now move
on to the question of the relationship between trade policy and productivity. In this section, we
analyze a central concern in the policy literature: how the presence of trade barriers impacts the
productivity of ﬁrms within a small, open economy which faces a technology gap in competing with
more productive foreign ﬁrms.
To build intuition start by considering the equilibrium rate of diﬀusion given by (6). Taking the
number of domestic (nh) and foreign (nf) ﬁrms as given, it follows immediately that lower trade
barriers decrease the speed of adoption (and thus reduce ﬁrm productivity). This negative impact
(which we refer to as the direct eﬀect) is due primarily to the scale eﬀect as lower protection decreases
the market share of domestic ﬁrms, and thus decreases their incentive to invest in productivity-
enhancing technology. However, this analysis is incomplete as it fails to account for the fact that
a reduction in trade barriers also tends to decrease proﬁts for domestic ﬁrms, thus deterring the
entry of domestic ﬁrms into the market. This reduction in the number of domestic ﬁrms results in
faster adoption (what we refer to as the indirect eﬀect) and an increase in ﬁrm productivity. Thus, a
trade liberalization episode is not equivalent to a simple increase in competition. Rather, it reﬂects a
substitution away from domestic competition and toward foreign competition (i.e., a tension between
direct and indirect eﬀects). In the following sections we consider the combined direct and indirect
eﬀects of a change in tariﬀs on the adoption decisions of domestic ﬁrms.
As mentioned, our interest is in the eﬀects of a trade liberalization episode on subsequent tech-






Consequently, no ﬁrm enters at t = 0 with the intention to exit, since they wouldn’t be able to cover their entry cost.
For a proof that all entry must occur at t = 0, see Ederington and McCalman (2006).










e−rtπH(q(t),b)dt − K(T) − F
Of interest is the comparative statics of a change in b (holding initial tariﬀs, b, constant). As
discussed in Ederington and McCalman (2006), the timing of the trade liberalization episode, TA,
will aﬀect the strength of the indirect eﬀect; intuitively, the later the trade agreement occurs, the
less impact trade liberalization will have on the discounted value of total proﬁts and thus the smaller
the aﬀect on n.13 However, the heterogeneous response to tariﬀs in our model is due to the tension
between the positive direct and negative indirect eﬀects of a tariﬀ increase. Since this tension is
independent of the timing of the trade liberalization episode, for expositional clarity the proofs and
derivations in the following sections consider the case where TA = 0.
3.1 Firm-level Heterogeneity in Tariﬀ Response
To gain insight into the relative intensity of the direct and indirect eﬀects, assume that both domestic
and foreign ﬁrms are in the market, and consider a small tariﬀ change, db, that has ﬁrms from both
countries continuing to operate after the change. To work out the impact of an increase in trade
barriers, we totally diﬀerentiate the zero proﬁt condition.
dΠ = δ0dπ0 + dΠA + δ1dπ1 = 0
The ﬁrst order conditions for adoption ensure that dΠA = 0, with the implication δ0dπ0 = −δ1dπ1.
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The increase in per-period proﬁts in the initial periods implies that TL decreases while the
decrease in ﬁnal per-period proﬁts implies that TH increases. Thus, the process of adoption starts
earlier but takes longer in response to a tariﬀ increase. The intuition for this result relates to the
change in the intensity of competition implied by technology adoption and how this interacts with
a larger number of domestic ﬁrms. While a tariﬀ induces more ﬁrms to enter the market, this entry
isn’t suﬃcient to oﬀset the increase in demand for domestic products generated by a tariﬀ when
13It should be noted that, given our assumption that ﬁrms are rational and forward-looking, adjustments in the
number of ﬁrms will occur at time zero, even when the trade liberalization episode occurs later.
10all domestic ﬁrms are low tech. As these low tech ﬁrms experience an increase in demand from a
tariﬀ, they are induced to start adopting earlier. However, as the now more numerous domestic
ﬁrms start adopting the superior technology, the intensity of competition increases to such an extent
that the last ﬁrm to adopt has their marginal beneﬁt from adoption lowered by the tariﬀ. Since a
tariﬀ induces more entry, eventually this generates more high-tech domestic ﬁrms, with the impact
of the greater number of high-tech domestic ﬁrms most apparent at the end of the adoption process.
In short, while the positive direct eﬀect is constant through time (since b and nf are constant), the
negative indirect eﬀect increases through time as q increases. Consequently, our framework predicts
that tariﬀs will have a heterogeneous impact on ﬁrms within an industry:
PROPOSITION 1 A tariﬀ will speed up the adoption date of early adopters and delay the adoption
date of late adopters.
That is, within industries, the model predicts that the impact of a tariﬀ change will not be
uniform across ﬁrms. Instead ﬁrms that have the apparent advantage of relatively high productivity
growth see this advantage further enhanced by a tariﬀ, while those that appear to lag the technology
frontier the most will ﬁnd their relative productivity growth further disadvantaged by a tariﬀ.14
This result is illustrated in Figure 1. The bold line represents the distribution of adoption dates
prior to the imposition of a tariﬀ on the industry (i.e., no one adopts, q = 0 until TL when adoption
begins and q increases until TH when everyone has adopted and q = 1). As can be seen in Figure 1,
the imposition of a tariﬀ has the eﬀect of speeding up the date of initial adoption (TL) and delaying
the date of ﬁnal adoption (TH), and thus extending the overall time of diﬀusion. However, as can
be seen from Figure 1, the heterogeneity in tariﬀ response across ﬁrms within an industry suggests
that the average response to a tariﬀ (i.e., whether a tariﬀ increases or decreases productivity growth
of the typical ﬁrm) is not clear cut. That is, whether a tariﬀ speeds-up or delays adoption by the
average ﬁrm (i.e., the ﬁrm adopting at the average adoption date) depends upon the point around
which the distribution function rotates, which may not be the same for all industries. Thus, in the
following section, we investigate how the impact of a tariﬀ change on productivity growth of the
median ﬁrm is likely to vary across industries.
3.2 Industry-level Heterogeneity in Tariﬀ Response
If some ﬁrms are induced to adopt earlier by a tariﬀ, while others adopt later a natural question is
what happens to the typical or average ﬁrm? Does a tariﬀ tend to raise or lower their productivity
performance? As discussed in the introduction, empirical evidence on this question is mixed. Given
that the same estimation techniques are employed in the empirical literature (and indeed one author
14Note that this result is relatively robust and holds for all non-prohibitive tariﬀs and it also holds when the number






Figure 1: Impact of a tariﬀ increase within an industry
appears on both sides of the evidence), what is it that distinguishes the situations where tariﬀs raise
the productivity of the average ﬁrm, from those where it lowers productivity? To provide insight
into this question, we characterize the behavior of the ﬁrm with the median adoption date.
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Since the LHS is declining in Tm, the median adoption date is negatively related to the value of the
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This is negative (median adoption date increases) if:
δ0(A0 − c)2 + δ1A2
1 < (δ0 + δ1)(A0 − c)A1
⇒ (A0 − c − A1)(δ0(A0 − c) − δ1A1) < 0















To evaluate this condition assume that it holds with equality, and then ask if a parameter change
makes this condition more or less likely to hold. Note that the factors that inﬂuence whether or
not this condition holds can be broken up into two broad groups. This division is based on the
observation that all of the elements of the LHS are exogenous parameters (b, c, α) while the RHS is
a function of two endogenous variables (TL and TH). Inspection of the list of exogenous parameters
that inﬂuence the LHS reveals that one is missing, the size of entry costs (F). The characterization
of the relationship between this factor and the productivity of the median ﬁrm is relatively straight
forward. Simple calculations show that decreases in F tend to increase both TL and TH, which
reduces the RHS. Consequently, industries that are relatively easy to enter are more likely to suﬀer
a decline in the productivity of the median ﬁrm in response to a tariﬀ. A similarly direct result
holds for c. A smaller technology gap, clearly raises the LHS. It also decreases the RHS, since more
ﬁrms are induced to enter, delaying both the start and the end of the adoption process. So an
increase in the tariﬀ is more likely to lower the productivity of the median ﬁrm if the technology
gap is relatively small.
Characterization of the impact of the other parameters (b, α) is slightly more involved. Note
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13Therefore, already high tariﬀs are likely to decrease the productivity of the median ﬁrm if they
are increased any further. Similarly industries with a relatively large market (α), will also tend
to experience slower productivity growth for the median ﬁrm in response to a tariﬀ. Thus, the
predictions of this section can be summarized as follows:
PROPOSITION 2 A tariﬀ increase is more likely to delay productivity-enhancing technology
adoption by the median ﬁrm in industry i if:
1. barriers to entry are relatively low (lower F),
2. the productivity improvement from technology adoption is small (lower c),
3. tariﬀs are already relatively high (higher b),









Figure 2: What happens to productivity for the majority of ﬁrms?
Note that the model predicts that the impact of a tariﬀ change on the productivity of the
median ﬁrm will not be uniform across industries. The intuition for this result derives from the
conﬂict between the positive direct eﬀect of trade barriers and the negative indirect eﬀect and is
illustrated in Figure 2. Speciﬁcally, in those industries where the indirect eﬀect is relatively strong,
a tariﬀ increase is more likely to delay technology adoption by the median ﬁrm. For example, in
14industries where barriers to entry are relatively low, an increase in protection results in a relatively
large increase in the number of ﬁrms. Thus, the indirect eﬀect of a tariﬀ change in such an industry
is relatively strong, and, as can be seen in Figure 2, one is more likely to observe protection having a
negative impact on the adoption decisions (and hence productivity) of the median ﬁrm. In contrast,
industries where the indirect eﬀect is relatively weak (high barriers to entry, large productivity gaps,
low tariﬀs and small domestic markets) will observe a positive correlation between trade protection
and productivity growth of a typical ﬁrm.
4 Colombian Trade Policy and Data Description
The model of the previous sections suggests a great deal of heterogeneity in the marginal impact
of a tariﬀ on the incentives of a ﬁrm to modernize and adopt new technologies. To investigate
this heterogeneity, we focus on the case of Colombia. Like many developing countries, Colombia
followed a policy of import substitution in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In the late 1970’s this policy
was reconsidered as Colombia sought entry into the GATT. Despite attaining membership in 1981,
Colombian tariﬀs on manufactured goods were relatively high with the average tariﬀ on manufactured
goods around 50 percent in 1984. However from this relatively high level of protection Colombia
systematically lowered its trade barriers through the 1980’s and 1990’s with an aim of creating a
relatively uniform structure of protection that was comparable to those in developed countries. This
change in trade policy provides variation not just in the level of protection but also the structure
of protection across industries, making Colombia a particularly appealing setting in which to study
the relationship between trade policy and productivity growth.15
Central to our analysis is the measurement of productivity. We follow Treﬂer (2004) and use
labor productivity.16 For our purposes labor productivity has a number of advantages over other
measures of productivity, most notably TFP. In particular, the theoretical framework developed
above emphasizes changes in technology that enhance labor productivity, making it a natural choice
to focus on. Also if technological diﬀerences are an important source of heterogeneity among ﬁrms,
the standard approach to measuring TFP, which relies on the estimation of a common industry level
production function, tends to ignore these sources of structural diﬀerence.17 Finally, by focusing on
15For an overview of the evolution of trade policy in Colombia see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and Fernandes
(2006). While political economy issues can arise in the determination of trade policy (see for example Matschke and
Sherlund (2006)), Fernandes (2006) establishes that trade policy is exogenous at the plant level in Colombia.
16While our methodology is common in the literature, it is not without its shortcomings. See Katayama, Lu, and
Tybout (2006) for a recent critique.
17Note also that since TFP is unobservable a number of assumptions need to be imposed to identify an unbiased
estimator of it. A common approach in the literature is to follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or Olley and Pakes
(1996) and assume that TFP follows an exogenous Markov process. Clearly this assumption is inconsistent with the
notion that a ﬁrm can take an action to change the evolution of its productivity.
15the median response, which implies the use of quantile regression techniques, we put less emphasis on
the precise measurement of productivity and more on the location of ﬁrms within the productivity
distribution, with this ranking likely to be robust to diﬀerent approaches to measuring productivity
(see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)). The deﬁnition of labor productivity we employ is real value
added relative to the number of production workers.18 As a measure of productivity growth we
follow Treﬂer (2004) and consider long diﬀerences, with 1984 as our base year since in corresponds
to the high point of average protection, and our end year is 1991, the ﬁnal year of data that is
available to us. Over this period, data is available for all manufacturing ﬁrms with at least 10
employees. For measures of trade liberalization, we employ ad-valorem tariﬀ levels and eﬀective
rates of protection that are available at the 4 digit ISIC level. Note that we follow Fernandes (2006)
and lag the tariﬀ data one year relative to the productivity data to mitigate issues associated with
the revenue based measure of productivity.19
The previous empirical approach to analyzing the link between trade policy and productivity is to
regress changes in ﬁrm-level productivity on changes in trade barriers, typically controlling for some
industry and/or ﬁrm characteristics. The usual hypothesis is that productivity is negatively related
to tariﬀs, with inference based on an estimate of the average productivity impact of a change in trade
policy across all ﬁrms in the sample. That is, a single coeﬃcient is used to identify the marginal
impact of a tariﬀ across both ﬁrms and industries. This methodology tends to be motivated by a
belief that competition increases productivity, though no formal models are developed to support
this hypothesis. In contrast, we have shown that a plausible model of technology adoption by
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms suggests that the marginal impact is unlikely to be either uniform in size
or sign. Thus, in the following sections we augment the previous empirical literature by using our
theoretical framework as a guide to investigate the marginal response of productivity to tariﬀs along
two dimensions: within-industry variation and across-industry variation. It is worth emphasizing
that we are only looking to see if there is evidence consistent with our predictions and not testing
our model. In doing so we are stressing the need to allow for a relatively rich set of responses to a
policy change rather than implying that ours is the only model that can generate a heterogeneous
response.
18We would like to thank Mark Roberts for making the Colombian manufacturing census data available to us. For a
complete description of all the variables used in our estimation, see the data appendix. For a description of this data
set see Roberts (1996).
19The 4 digit ISIC tariﬀ data is from Departamento Nacional de Planeacion and the matching trade data is from
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica. We would like to thank Jorge Garcia-Gracia at the World
Bank for making this data available.
165 Within-Industry Variation
In this section we consider whether the marginal impact of trade liberalization varies across ﬁrms
within an industry. Note that Proposition 1 suggests that the impact of trade liberalization will not
be uniform, instead ﬁrms that have the apparent advantage of relatively high productivity growth see
this advantage further enhanced by a tariﬀ, while those that appear to lag the technology frontier the
most will ﬁnd their relative productivity growth further disadvantaged by a tariﬀ. Therefore the ﬁrst
step must be to determine which ﬁrm characteristics are associated with high productivity growth
(early adoption) within an industry.20 Here we follow an empirical strategy based on the previous
literature (see Treﬂer (2004)), and regress ﬁrm characteristics on productivity growth. Therefore,
productivity growth (from 1984 to 1991) for ﬁrm j in industry i, ∆pr
j
i, is given by:
∆pr
j
i = γi + βxXj + j
where γi are 4 digit ﬁxed eﬀects and Xj are ﬁrm characteristics such as size, age, technology rank
and exporter status.
Table 1 reports the determinants of ﬁrm level productivity growth. The ﬁrst column is a relatively
standard ﬁrm level productivity growth equation, where the determinants of growth are: size, age,
technology rank and exporter status (along with 4 digit ﬁxed eﬀects). All ﬁrm characteristics are
taken from the Colombian manufacturing census. The size of the ﬁrm is the log of employment.
The age of the ﬁrm is the log of the number of years since start-up. The technology rank is the
diﬀerence between labor productivity for the plant and average labor productivity scaled by the
standard deviation in labor productivity within the (4-digit ISIC) industry. Finally, exporter status
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the plant is an exporter in 1984. The results
suggest that larger ﬁrms, exporting ﬁrms and younger ﬁrms tend to have the highest productivity
growth rates within industries. The only potentially surprising result is that productivity growth is
negatively correlated with high initial productivity. However, this result is consistent with a story
where ﬁrms already on the technology frontier have fewer options for further productivity growth,
generating mean reversion between ﬁrms within an industry.
The second column addresses the issue of selection of plants into the sample, since a growth
rate can only be calculated for ﬁrms that survive until 1991. This column reports results for the
standard Heckman selection methodology. The ﬁrst stage probit includes all of the variables from
the ﬁrst column along with an exclusion restriction. In this case, the share of oﬃce equipment in
total capital in 1984 forms a plausible restriction since this variable is unlikely to be directly related
to the growth in productivity (since it is not part of the capital used in production), but is likely
to be associated with a greater likelihood of exit. The greater likelihood of exit follows from the
20Within the model, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent about their exact location in the productivity distribution. Thus, the
model provides no guidance about which ﬁrms will be the early adopters of new technologies, and which ﬁrms will be
late adopters. Our approach is to identify these characteristics empirically.
17notion that ﬁrms with a greater share of capital tied up in unproductive assets are less likely to
survive a negative shock. The results from a probit estimation are consistent with this conjecture,
with the coeﬃcient on oﬃce equipment negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (see column
9, Table A.1). Returning to column 2 of Table 1, it is notable that the coeﬃcient on the control
for the selection probability, λ, is positive and signiﬁcant. The positive λ implies that the shocks
that inﬂuence survival are positively correlated with the shocks that generate productivity growth,
a result that squares with expectations. With the exception of size, all of the remaining coeﬃcients
are relatively unaﬀected by the selection process. Furthermore, the standard errors are only slightly
higher, with inference still concluding that all variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
With the ﬁrm characteristics that determine productivity growth in hand we now revisit Propo-
sition 1 which suggests potential heterogeneity in tariﬀ response across ﬁrms within an industry.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 suggests that if a characteristic contributes to high productivity
growth, then when it is interacted with changes in trade barriers, productivity growth should be
further enhanced (i.e. the interaction term should be have the same sign as the characteristic alone):
∆pr
j
i = γi + βxXj + βx∗bXj∆bi + j
• If βx > 0 then βx∗b > 0
• If βx < 0 then βx∗b < 0
where ∆pr
j
i, is once again productivity growth for ﬁrm j in industry i, γi are 4 digit ﬁxed eﬀects
and Xj are ﬁrm characteristics: size, age, technology rank and exporter status. Finally, ∆bi is the
change in tariﬀ barriers over the time period (lagged one year) for industry i.
Note that the above speciﬁcation allows the marginal impact of a trade barrier to vary across
ﬁrms within the industry. Speciﬁcally, it predicts that an increase in tariﬀ barriers should result in
larger ﬁrms, exporting ﬁrms and younger ﬁrms having higher productivity growth (i.e., have greater
incentives to adopt new technologies) relative to other ﬁrms in the industry. Note that, since the
estimated model includes four digit ﬁxed eﬀects, only ﬁrm level characteristics and their interactions
can be included (i.e. tariﬀ changes cannot be included separately).
The third column of Table 1 reports the results of the ﬁrm level productivity growth estimates
when tariﬀ change interaction terms are included for all of the ﬁrm level characteristics. All the
interaction terms have the same sign as the growth generating characteristics when entered alone.
This matches the prediction that ﬁrms with the potential for higher productivity growth beneﬁt from
a tariﬀ, while those with low growth potential are hurt (remember that this is within an industry).
Furthermore, the interaction terms on age and exporter status are statistically signiﬁcant. Thus,
the results suggest that larger ﬁrms, exporting ﬁrms and younger ﬁrms are more likely to receive
any of the productivity beneﬁts from tariﬀs. Column 4 conﬁrms that these results are not altered
when accounting for selection.21 Furthermore, the signs and signiﬁcance of these interactions terms
21The ﬁrst stage regression is the same one used in column 2. For the purposes of consistently, whenever an equation
includes a control for the selection eﬀect in Tables 1 or 2, the equation from column 9 of Table A.1 is used.
18are relatively robust to the time period considered, the use of lagged tariﬀs or eﬀective rates of
protection and which interaction terms are included (see Table A.1 in the appendix).
To gain insight into the economic signiﬁcance of the interaction terms consider a high growth
ﬁrm which is one standard deviation above the mean in terms of size, and one standard deviation
below the mean in terms of age. Such a ﬁrm is predicted to have productivity grow by 0.4 of a
percent per annum faster relative to the mean in the presence of a 20 percent tariﬀ increase. Given
the symmetry of the estimates, a low growth ﬁrm one standard deviation below the mean in terms of
size, and one standard deviation above the mean in terms of age would have productivity grow 0.4 of
a percent slower, generating almost a one percentage point diﬀerential. This implies relatively large
diﬀerences across ﬁrms within the same industry. Overall, table 1 provides evidence that within
industries ﬁrms have a diﬀerential response to tariﬀs that is both statistically and economically
signiﬁcant, with the heterogeneity consistent with the predictions of Proposition 1.
6 Across Industry Variation
While Proposition 1 predicts heterogeneity in the tariﬀ response across ﬁrms within an industry,
Proposition 2 suggests the presence of heterogeneity in tariﬀ response across industries. In particular
it says that whether or not the majority of ﬁrms in an industry improve their productivity perfor-
mance when a tariﬀ is applied depends on the characteristics of the industry (i.e. the impact of a
given tariﬀ change varies across industries; so the tariﬀ change should be interacted with industry
characteristics). Thus, in this section we investigate whether the marginal impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on the productivity growth of the median ﬁrm is conditional on industry-level characteristics.
In this respect, our theory provides some guidance as Proposition 2 suggest some explicit industry
characteristics that should be related to the strength of the indirect eﬀect and thus the marginal
impact of a tariﬀ change. To measure these characteristics, we follow convention as closely as
possible. Barriers to entry (Fi) are measured as the negative of the average annual entry rate in a
four digit industry (a lower entry rate is associated with higher barriers to entry).22 The technology
gap (ci) is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the productivity of the most productive ﬁrm and the
least productive ﬁrm scaled by the productivity of the least productive ﬁrm within an industry.
Relative market size (αi) is measured as the expenditure on an industry relative to spending on all
manufacturing. All of these measures are drawn from the Colombian census of manufactures and
use data from 1984 or earlier. Thus, the empirical model is:
∆pr
j
i = γi + β0∆bi + β1Fi∆bi + β2ci∆bi + β3bi∆bi + β4αi∆bi + βxXj + βzZi + j (11)
where ∆pr
j
i, is once again productivity growth for ﬁrm j in industry i, γi are 2 digit ﬁxed eﬀects,
Xj are ﬁrm characteristics and Zi are industry characteristics. Finally, ∆bi is the change in tariﬀ
22Annual entry rates are calculated for the period 1977-82, and then averaged. Over this period, all ﬁrms are
reported in the dataset without a 10 employee cut-oﬀ.
19barriers over the time period (lagged one year) for industry i.
The key predictions of Proposition 2 are, ﬁrst, that a tariﬀ increase is more likely to encourage
adoption by the median ﬁrm in industries where barriers to entry (Fi) are high (i.e., β1 > 0).
Second, that the median ﬁrm’s response to a tariﬀ increase is likely to be positive in industries with
larger technology gaps (ci) and lower tariﬀs (i.e., β2 > 0 and β3 < 0). Finally, the model predicts
that tariﬀs increase productivity growth of the majority of ﬁrms in industries where the size of the
domestic market (αi) is smaller (i.e., β4 < 0).
Before we explore potential heterogeneity in the marginal productivity impact of a tariﬀ change,
we benchmark our methodology. The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the results from the standard
approach using ordinary least squares techniques, controlling for ﬁrm characteristics and two digit
industry ﬁxed eﬀects. In line with the results from Fernandes (2006), who also investigates the
impact of trade liberalization in Colombia on ﬁrm productivity, the ﬁrst column reports that ﬁrms
in industries that experienced larger tariﬀ reductions had greater mean productivity growth. To
gain insight into what might be driving this response and also move the estimation technique closer
to one suitable for exploring our theoretical predictions (since these relate to the median rather
than the mean), the second column reports the results from a median regression with the same
speciﬁcation as column 1 otherwise. Now we see that tariﬀ reductions are associated with lower
productivity growth. While the diﬀerence in sign is not likely to be signiﬁcant, it does have two
immediate implications. First it underscores the importance of heterogeneity in the data, with
diﬀerent methodologies producing diﬀerent results. Second, it also cautions that outliers are likely
to have played an important and under appreciated role in the results of previous studies. Since there
is a large degree of heterogeneity in the data, concerns are naturally raised about a speciﬁcation that
assumes the marginal eﬀect is the same for all ﬁrms both within and across industries. Indeed, there
is no reason to expect a uniform marginal response, and our theoretical analysis provides strong
reasons to expect the existence of non-linearities in the correlation between tariﬀ changes and ﬁrm
productivity growth. We now augment the standard empirical speciﬁcation by considering these
possibilities.
To investigate how the response of the median ﬁrm varies across industries we include the in-
teraction terms in the speciﬁcation as suggested by equation (11).23 The results are presented in
column 3 of Table 2. To standardize the interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients, all of the in-
dustry characteristics have been centered at zero. In this case, the impact of a tariﬀ change on the
median ﬁrm in an industry with average sample characteristics is given by the tariﬀ change term
alone. By centering the data in this way, we see that the median ﬁrm in the average industry is pre-
dicted to have lower productivity growth due to trade liberalization. However, the model developed
above does not predict a uniform response to tariﬀ changes, so focusing on the predicted outcome
for the average industry is unlikely to provide any general insights. Instead the model predicts that
23In addition to including industry characteristics (size, barriers to entry, initial tariﬀs and technology gap) in the
interaction terms, we also include these industry characteristics as separate, linear terms in the estimation.
20industry characteristics will be important in determining whether the majority of ﬁrms within an
industry respond to tariﬀ changes by raising or lowering their productivity growth. This places
primary importance on the signs and signiﬁcance of the interaction terms. In this respect all the
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms in column 3 have the predicted signs (that a tariﬀ decrease is
more likely to encourage productivity improvements in industries with low barriers to entry, small
technology gaps, high tariﬀs and large domestic market size). Moreover, all four interaction terms
are statistically signiﬁcant.
However, one concern might be that the results are biased due to the presence of the sample
selection issue discussed previously. Given the use of quantile regression, the standard Heckman
correction doesn’t apply. In this case we follow the methodology set out in Buchinsky (1998). This
involves approximating the unknown correction term in the second stage by a polynomial expansion
of a ﬁrst stage index.24 From the results reported in column 4, it is clear that the parameter estimates
are relatively unaﬀected by the inclusion of a control function for sample selection. To provide a
more familiar benchmark, column 5 reports results from mean regression while column 6 reports the
results from the standard Heckman correction. Reassuringly, all the coeﬃcients have the predicted
signs and three of the four interaction terms are statistically signiﬁcant. Once again, there is little
diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients and the standard errors in the corrected and uncorrected models,
suggesting that sample selection is not driving the results. Furthermore, the signs and signiﬁcance
of these interactions terms are relatively robust to the time period considered, the use of lagged
tariﬀs or eﬀective rates of protection and which interaction terms are included (see table A.2 in the
appendix for details). These results conﬁrm the presence of signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the median
tariﬀ response, with such variation being consistent with the predictions of our model of endogenous
technology adoption.
To gain insight into whether these interaction terms are of economic signiﬁcance, we use the
estimates to predict how each industry would be aﬀected by a 20 percentage point tariﬀ cut. As
can be seen in the graph below, for the majority of industries the productivity growth of the median
ﬁrm increases as a result of the tariﬀ cut. More importantly the histogram also provides a sense of
the diversity of response embodied in the data. In this graph the x-axis lists the predicted annual
compound growth rates for the median ﬁrm. For three quarters of the Colombian manufacturing
industries a 20 percentage point reduction in tariﬀs has a positive impact on productivity growth
for the majority of ﬁrms. In fact, it is predicted that a quarter of all industries have the majority
of ﬁrms raising their productivity growth by over 2 percentage points due to lower tariﬀs. However,
for a quarter of the Colombian manufacturing sector, the median ﬁrm experiences slower produc-
tivity growth. This suggests a very diverse response to trade liberalization across industries. Thus,
the cross industry variation appears to be not only statistically important but also economically
24For the purposes of consistency a quadratic involving the inverse mills ratio was used based on the probit equation
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While the histogram gives a sense of the diversity of behavior across industries in relation to
the median, the theoretical model can also be used to characterize other parts of the distribution,
generating further predictions to be investigated. In particular, it is straight forward to show that
Proposition 2 generalizes to other quantiles of the productivity distribution. Therefore, the interac-
tion terms are predicted to have the same sign regardless of which quantile is considered. To assess
this prediction, the seventh and eighth columns of Table 2 report results of the ﬁrst and third quartile
regressions. In line with the theory all the interaction terms have the predicted signs. Furthermore,
for both the ﬁrst and third quartiles the interaction terms involving barriers to entry, technology
gaps and industry size are statistically signiﬁcant. Given the lack of structure imposed on the data
by the quantile regression technique, the relative success of these ancillary theoretical predictions
oﬀers solid support for the robustness of the mechanism outlined in our theoretical model. Overall
the estimates in these tables show that the factors that the theory predicts should be important for
determining variation in response to tariﬀ changes across industries, are in fact important in the
data.
7 Conclusion
A central issue in the trade policy literature is the relationship between trade policy and ﬁrm
productivity. An older view assumed that tariﬀs would allow domestic ﬁrms to capture a larger
market share, thereby encouraging domestic ﬁrms to invest in better technology. However, more
recently emphasis has been placed on the productivity enhancing eﬀects of foreign competition
22as it drives out ineﬃcient domestic ﬁrms and prompts the surviving ﬁrms to modernize. While
determining which view is correct is essentially an empirical question, the mixed results in the
existing literature suggest that a simple empirical strategy is not suﬃcient to identify the underlying
mechanisms. In this paper we developed a model that captures an essential feature of the data; ﬁrms,
even within narrowly deﬁned industries, have very diﬀerent characteristics, including productivity.
This observation suggests that ﬁrms within the same industry may react very diﬀerently to changes in
trade policy, making it diﬃcult to identify the behavior of a ‘typical’ ﬁrm without an understanding
of the source of the ﬁrm heterogeneity. By developing a theoretical model that provides insight into
this heterogeneity we are able to characterize the diﬀerential response to tariﬀs not only by ﬁrms
within industries but also by ﬁrms across industries.
To investigate these predictions we examine the Colombian experience with trade liberalization
since the mid 1980’s. Not only did Colombia undertake a substantial program of unilateral trade
liberalization that resulted in a large fall in the average tariﬀ on industrial goods, but the structure
of protection was also dramatically altered. In this setting we found that trade liberalization tended
to raise the productivity of the typical ﬁrm in industries with low barriers to entry, small technology
gaps, large markets and also large initial levels of protection. By including these industry charac-
teristics we are able to provide a more nuanced view of how industries are likely to vary in their
response to trade liberalization. However, we also found evidence that ﬁrms within industries also
had a diﬀerential response to tariﬀ changes, not just in terms of magnitude of response but in terms
of whether it improved or undermined a ﬁrms productivity performance. Speciﬁcally we found that
larger ﬁrms, younger ﬁrms and exporting ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms with high rankings in the productivity
distribution) tend to grow faster as tariﬀs are raised. Finally, we show that such variation across
ﬁrms and across industries is consistent with a our model of endogenous technology adoption. Thus,
the results of this paper (both theoretical and empirical) highlight the fact that the relationship be-
tween tariﬀs and productivity is not likely to be a simple one and will vary not only across industries
but also within industries.
23A Data
All ﬁrm data are taken from a plant-level dataset produced from the Colombian Manufacturing cen-
sus by DANE (National Statistical Institute) for the years 1977 through 1991. From 1983 the census
covers industrial production for plants with greater than 10 employees. Our empirics concentrate
on plants which were operating in both 1984 and 1991. For a thorough description of this dataset
see Roberts (1996).
A.1 Firm Characteristics
Productivity Growth: the compound rate of change in labor productivity from 1984 to 1991. Labor
productivity is measured as real-value added for the plant divided by the number of production
workers (total employment minus owners and management staﬀ).
Size: the log of employment. This characteristic is centered at zero by subtracting out the average
size of the plants within the sample.
Age: the log of the number of years since the start up of the plant to the year 1984. This characteristic
is centered at zero by subtracting out the average age of the plants within the sample.
Technology Rank: the diﬀerence between labor productivity for the plant and average labor pro-
ductivity in the (4-digit ISIC) industry. This diﬀerence is scaled by the standard deviation of labor
productivity within the industry.
Exporter Status: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the plant exported in 1984.
A.2 Industry Characteristics
Tariﬀ : ad-valorem tariﬀ at the 4-digit ISIC level. Provided by Jorge Garcia at the World Bank.
The tariﬀ change for a 4-digit industry is simply the diﬀerence between 1990 and 1983 ad-valorem
tariﬀs.
Entry Costs: the negative of the average annual entry rate within a 4-digit ISIC industry over the
period 1977-82. This characteristic is centered at zero by subtracting out the average entry rates of
all industries within the sample.
Technology Gap: the diﬀerence between the maximum and minimum labor productivities of plants
within a 4-digit ISIC industry in 1984. This diﬀerence is scaled by the productivity of the least
productive plant within the industry.
Industry Size: the ratio of total domestic sales for a 4-digit ISIC industry in 1984 to total domestic
sales for all industries in the sample. Total domestic sales are found by summing sales for all plants
at the 4-digit ISIC level and then adding in total imports for the industry (import data is provided
by Jorge Garcia at the World Bank). This characteristic is centered at zero by subtracting out the
average industry size of all industries within the sample.
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Impact of Tariffs on Firm Productivity Growth – Within Industry Variation 
Colombian Manufacturing Sector, 1984-1991 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 OLS  Heckman  OLS  Heckman 
Size 1.87***  3.05***  2.00***  3.17*** 
 (0.22)  (0.68)  (0.29)  (0.70) 
Size*ΔTariff     0.01  0.01 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tech Rank  -2.72***  -2.39***  -2.80***  -2.48*** 
 (0.19)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.33) 
Tech Rank*ΔTariff     -0.004  -0.01 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
Age -0.77***  -0.62**  -1.08***  -0.95*** 
 (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.32)  (0.33) 
Age*ΔTariff     -0.02*  -0.02* 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
Exporter in 1984  2.49***  2.16***  3.59***  3.30*** 
 (0.63)  (0.68)  (0.85)  (0.90) 
Exporter*ΔTariff     0.08*  0.08** 
     (0.04)  (0.04) 
4 Digit Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
λ   6.57*    6.90* 
   (3.58)    (3.73) 
R-squared 0.13    0.14   
Observations 3388  3382  3388  3382 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   




 Table 2 
Impact of Tariffs on Firm Productivity Growth – Across Industry Variation 
Colombian Manufacturing Sector, 1984-1991 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 OLS  Median  Median  Med/Selection  OLS  Heckman  1
st Quartile  3
rd Quartile 
ΔTariff -0.01  0.01  0.20***  0.18**  0.11  0.10  0.24***  0.06 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Entry*ΔTariff     0.8***  0.6*  1.0***  1.0***  1.0***  0.7* 
     (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.4)  (0.4)  (0.4) 
Gap*ΔTariff     0.01***  0.01***  0.005*  0.005*  0.008***  0.008** 
     (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Ind. Size*ΔTariff     -4.6***  -4.7***  -2.8**  -2.8**  -5.6***  -4.3*** 
     (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)  (1.4)  (1.3)  (1.6) 
Tariff*ΔTariff     -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0005 
     (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0006)  (0.0007) 
Linear terms      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3388  3388  3388  3382  3388  3382  3382  3382 
R-squared 0.09        0.10       
Pseudo R-sq    0.05  0.07           
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All estimated equations include 2 digit effects and firm level characteristics: size, age, exporter status, technology rank.        
Entry, Gap, Ind. Size and Tariff have all been centered at zero. 
Tariffs and tariff changes are lagged one period. 
  
Table A.1 
Impact of Tariffs on Firm Productivity Growth – Within Industry Variation 
Colombian Manufacturing Sector, Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Size  3.19***  3.25***  3.92*** 4.00*** 3.05*** 3.07*** 3.16*** 2.98*** 0.38*** 
  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.79) (0.71) (0.68) (0.69) (0.69) (0.68) (0.02) 
Size*ΔTariff  0.003  0.001  0.005 0.003 0.004        
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.011)      
Tech Rank  -2.517***  -2.505***  -3.89***  -2.84***  -2.41*** -2.42*** -2.37*** -2.41*** 0.12*** 
  (0.388) (0.304) (0.41) (0.34) (0.27) (0.31) (0.27) (0.27) (0.02) 
Tech Rank*ΔTar  -0.003  -0.004  -0.03***  -0.016   -0.002     
  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.01)  (0.016)   (0.01)     
Age -1.14***  -0.808***  -0.50  -0.92***  -0.62** -0.62** -0.87***  -0.60** 0.04* 
  (0.41)  (0.298) (0.46) (0.34) (0.25) (0.25) (0.32) (0.25) (0.02) 
Age*ΔTariff  -0.01*  -0.01*  -0.002  0.010    -0.015    
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)  (0.02)     (0.01)    
Exporter    3.27***  3.170*** 1.64  2.39**  2.17*** 2.15*** 2.12*** 3.16*** 0.05 
  (0.90)  (0.793) (1.19) (0.95) (0.68) (0.68) (0.69) (0.87) (0.08) 
Exporter*ΔTariff  0.08*  0.04**  0.022  0.01     0.07*   
  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)     (0.04)   
Office  Equip            -0.33** 
            ( 0 . 1 5 )  
Observations  3382  3297  3915 3593 3382 3382 3382 3382 5565 
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Size, tech rank and Age have all been centered at zero. All estimated equations included 4 digit fixed effects and correct for selection. 
(1)  Contemporaneous tariffs are used rather lagged tariffs. 
(2)  Effective rates of protection are used in place of tariffs. 
(3)  Data covers period 1985 to 1991. 
(4)  Data covers period 1984 to 1990. 
(5) - (8) Interaction terms considered individually. 




Impact of Tariffs on Firm Productivity Growth – Across Industry Variation 
Colombian Manufacturing Sector, 
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ΔTariff  0.01  0.10***  0.22*** 0.48*** 0.24***  -0.09**  -0.01  0.02 
  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Entry*ΔTariff  0.7***  0.5***  0.9*** 1.8*** 1.3***       
  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.3) (0.4) (0.2)       
Gap*ΔTariff 0.005***  0.004***  0.22 0.16***    0.002     
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.33) (0.03)   (0.002)     
Ind. Size*ΔTar -2.2*** -1.6***  -4.0***  -11.7***      -4.0***   
  (0.8)  (0.6)  (1.0) (1.7)     (0.8)   
Tariff*ΔTariff -0.0002  -0.0001**  -0.0008*  -0.0007        -0.001*** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0004) (0.0008)       (0.000) 
Linear  terms  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3379  3294  3946 3629 3415  3382  3382  3382 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All estimated equations include 2 digit effects and firm level characteristics: size, age, exporter status, technology rank.    
Entry, Gap, Ind. Size and Tariff have all been centered at zero. 
All equations include a control function to correct for selection. 
(1)  Contemporaneous tariffs are used rather lagged tariffs. 
(2)  Effective rates of protection are used in place of tariffs. 
(3)  Data covers period 1985 to 1991. 
(4)  Data covers period 1984 to 1990. 
(5) - (8) Interaction terms considered individually. 
 